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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

SOUTHERN UTAH FEDERAL
CREDIT UNION,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.
Case No. 930329-CA
OLYMPUS BANK and
and JOSEPH E. STEVENS,
Defendants/Appellees.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE JOSEPH E. STEVENS

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
This appeal was taken to the Utah

Supreme

authority of Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2 (3) (j) .

Court

on the

The Supreme Court

assigned the case to this Court, and this Court has jurisdiction,
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(k) and Rule 42 of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
This action is a challenge to the validity of a trustee's
foreclosure sale by which Appellant Credit Union's interest in
certain real property was extinguished.

This Court must determine

whether the District Court erred in its summary judgment that the
foreclosure sale was valid as a matter of law because the purpose
of

the

statutory

Trustee's

Sale

notice

adequately

requirement

was

met,

the

described

the

place

of

Notice
sale,

of
the

interests of the debtors were not sacrificed in the sale and any
injury to the Credit Union resulted from its own error.

The standard of review is that of "correctness" as to the
District Court's conclusions of law and its determination that
there were no genuine

issues of material

fact.

Neiderhauser

Builders & Development Corp. v. Campbell, 824 P.2d 1193, 1196 (Utah
App. 1992).

In review of this summary judgment, this Court should

apply the same Rule 56 standard as that applied by the District
Court,

that

there

is

no

genuine

issue

of

material

Appellees are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

fact

and

Barber v.

Farmers Insurance Exchange, 751 P.2d 248, 251 (Utah App. 1988);
Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE AND RULE
The

Credit

Union

bases

its

appeal

on

a

restrictive

interpretation of Utah Code Ann. §57-1-25(2) regarding trustee's
sales:
The sale shall be held at the time and place
designated in the notice of sale which shall be
between the hours of 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. and at the
courthouse of the county in which the property to
be sold, or some part thereof, is situated.
Appellee Stevens submits that this statute is relevant, but
not necessarily determinative of the issues before this Court.
Rule

56(c), Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure, also contains

following applicable standard:
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if
the
pleadings,
depositions,
answers
to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law.
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the

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the case.

Appellant is a credit union which

held an interest in certain real property pursuant to a second
trust deed. Appellee Olympus Bank was the beneficiary of the first
trust deed interest in the same real property.

The debtor and

property owner, who is not a party to this action, defaulted his
obligations to the Bank, and the Bank commenced foreclosure of the
first trust deed under the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §57-1-23 et
sea., by giving Notice of Default followed by Notice of Trustee's
Sale.

The Notice (see Addendum) specified the place of sale as

"the Washington County Courthouse, at or about 197 East Tabernacle,
St.

George,

Washington

County,

Utah."

The

building

at

the

specified address formerly housed the courts of Washington County,
but

now

houses

Recorder.

other

county

officers,

Washington

County

courts

including

are

now

the

housed

County
in

the

Washington County Hall of Justice, three blocks away from the
address given in the Notice of Trustee's Sale.
On

the

day

of

sale,

October

20,

1992,

the

Bank's

representative and five other persons went to the place of sale
specified in the Notice. The Credit Union's representative and its
attorney went to the Hall of Justice and found no sale there.

The

Bank's representative sold the real property at public auction at
the address specified in the notice, and Appellee Joseph E. Stevens
was the highest bidder.
Having lost its subordinate interest in the real property
without

being

present

to

bid

at

the

sale, the

Credit

challenged the validity of the notice and the place of sale.

3

Union

B.

Course

of proceedings.

The

Credit Union

filed

its

Complaint on November 6, 1992, and obtained a temporary restraining
order, without hearing or prior notice, which prohibited the Bank
from delivering to Mr. Stevens the trustee's deed to the real
property.

Counsel for the Bank and Mr. Stevens later stipulated to

continuance of the temporary restraining order pending the District
Court's disposition

of the case.

By

informal

stipulation of

counsel, Answers to the Complaint were not filed.
On November 25, 1992, the Bank filed its Motion for Summary
Judgment and supporting documents. On December 8, 1992, the Credit
Union filed its own Motion for Summary Judgment and objection to
the Bank's motion, with supporting documents.

The Credit Union

stipulated to the Bank's statement of facts, however, and added two
affidavits which both supported the stipulated
other unstipulated statements.

facts and added

On December 14, 1992, Mr. Stevens

filed his Memorandum of Points and Authorities, joining the Bank's
motion and opposing the Credit Union's motion.

Mr. Stevens also

stipulated to the Bank's statement of facts, with th<* exception of
the last sentence of the Bank's paragraph 19. Mr. Stevens further
submitted his own affidavit as to additional facts.
Oral argument on both motions was heard by the District Court
on December 17, 1992.
C.

Disposition by the District Court.

The District Court

granted the Bank's Motion for Summary Judgment and denied the
Credit

Union's

motion

on

the

basis

of

the

facts

which

were

stipulated by all parties. The District Court concluded that there
were no genuine

issues of material

fact.

The District Court

further concluded, on the principal basis of a prior decision of
4

this Court, that the trustee's sale was valid because the Notice of
Trustee's

Sale

met

the

purposes

of

the

statutory

notice

requirement, it adequately described the location of the sale-,
there was no evidence that the debtor's interests were sacrificed
in the sale and any injury to the Credit Union resulted from its
own

error.

temporary

Consequently,

restraining

the

order

District

and

Court

dismissed

the

terminated
Credit

the

Union's

Complaint.
STATEMENT OP PACTS
A.

Stipulated facts.

As noted above, the Bank filed the

first Motion for Summary Judgment in this action.

Its supporting

Memorandum contains twenty-six paragraphs of "undisputed facts."
(Record on Appeal pp. 17-22.)
Bank's

undisputed

facts

The Credit Union agreed to the

without

qualification

in

its

own

Memorandum, and simply added reference to two affidavits submitted
by the Credit Union.
11-13 and 32-37.)

(Record p. 38; for affidavits see Record pp.

Mr. Stevens also stipulated and agreed to the

Bank's statement of undisputed facts in his Memorandum, with one
exception.

(Record p. 57.)

affidavit.

Mr. Stevens further added his own

(Record pp. 65-67.)

The District Court's Summary Judgment recites that the Court
reviewed all motions, memoranda, affidavits and pleadings, and
based its decision on the undisputed facts stated in the Summary
Judgment (see Addendum), which are as follows (Record pp. 17-22,
38, 57, 76-79):
1.

This action deals with real property

(hereinafter

"the Property") located in St. George, Washington County, State of
Utah, and more particularly described as follows:
5

All of Lot Nine (9) , Green Valley Subdivision,
a subdivision according to the official plat
thereof, on file in the office of the Recorder
of Washington County, State of Utah.
2.

Olympus Bank held a first position deed of trust

lien in the Property in the approximate sum of $3 5,000.
3.

SUFCU [the Credit Union] held a second position deed

of trust lien in the Property, in the approximate sum of $25,000.
4.

On September

29, 1992, Olympus

Bank mailed

its

Notice of Trustee's Sale to all interested parties having any
interest of record in the Property.
5.

[The Credit Union] received four separate envelopes,

each containing an identical copy of the Notice of Trustee's Sale.
6.

Two

envelopes

were

addressed

to

"Southern

Utah

Federal Credit Union" and two were addressed to "St. George Federal
Credit Union nka Southern Utah Federal Credit Union."
7.

Two of the four notices were sent via regular mail

and two were sent via certified mail, return receipt requested.
8.

The two certified mailings were received by a "Pat

Stratton" who signed both post office return receipts on October 5,
1992.
9.

Neither of the two notices which were sent via

regular mail were ever returned to Olympus Bank as undeliverable.
10.

In addition to the mailing of Notices of Trusteefs

Sale to all interested parties, Olympus Bank caused the notice to
be posted on the subject property and in three public places in
Washington County, Utah, on September 27, 1992.
11.

Furthermore, Olympus Bank caused the notice to be

6

published in The Daily Spectrum on Tuesday, September 22, 1992;
Tuesday, September 29, 1992; and on Tuesday, October 6, 1992.
12.

The Notice of Trustee's Sale recited that the sale

would be held at the Washington County Courthouse, at or about 197
East Tabernacle in St. George, Utah.
13.

The building located at 197 East Tabernacle in St.

George is the "Washington County Administration Building."

This

building does not house any of the courts.
14.

In times past, the Washington County Administration

Building housed the Fifth Judicial District Court and was called
the "Washington County Courthouse."
15.

Although the building located at 197 East Tabernacle

no longer houses any courts, it is still

referred

to as the

"Courthouse" or the "Old Courthouse" by many residents of St.
George, Utah.
16.

Some foreclosure sales are still conducted at 197

East Tabernacle and title insurance companies insure such sales.
17.

The Fifth Judicial District Court is now located at

22 0 North 2 00 East in St. George, Utah, in a building named the
"Hall of Justice."
18.

Representatives of [the Credit Union] had contacted

Olympus Bank in the days prior to the trustee's sale to discuss the
fact that
trustee's

[the Credit Union] would

appear at and bid

sale for the purpose of protecting

at the

its second

lien

position in the Property.
19.

Mr. Stevens and [the Credit Union] had discussed the

trustee's sale over the phone approximately two weeks prior to the
sale.
7

20.
representative

On

October

20,

1992,

Bob

Elliott,

as

the

of Olympus Bank, Mr. Stevens and several other

individuals went to 197 East Tabernacle, St. George, Utah, to
witness or participate in the 10:00 a.m. foreclosure sale.
21.

The representative of [the Credit Union] and its

counsel went to the Hall of Justice at 220 North 200 East, St.
George,Utah, to participate in the foreclosure sale.
22.

Bob Elliott conducted the foreclosure sale at 197

East Tabernacle and received bids from Olympus Bank, Mr. Stevens
and one other individual.
23.

The highest bid was received from Mr. Stevens and

Bob Elliott sold the property to him.
24.

Shortly after the foreclosure sale was conducted,

[the Credit Union] contacted Bob Elliott to inquire as to why the
sale had not been conducted.
25.

Mr. Elliott informed

[the Credit Union] that the

sale had been conducted at 197 East Tabernacle.
The District Court also included certain undisputed

facts

regarding the procedural history of the action. The District Court
then concluded

"that there are no material

issues of fact in

dispute" and rendered Summary Judgment on the basis of the foregoing undisputed facts.
B.

(Record pp. 79-81; see Addendum.)

Immaterial allegations.

It is implicit in the Summary

Judgment that the District Court considered certain other facts
asserted in affidavits filed by the Credit Union to be insufficient
to raise a genuine issue of material fact.

The Credit Union's

Brief on this appeal contains references to allegations regarding

8

the value of the subject property which were not stipulated as fact
and which were not presented to the District Court in any manner
sufficient to meet the requirements of Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.

The supporting statement of the Credit Union's

representative about the assessed value of the property (Record p.
35) was clearly hearsay and not competent or admissible evidence
under Rule 56.

See, e.g., Walker v. Rocky Mountain Recreation

Corporation, 19 Utah 2d 274, 508 P. 2d 538 (1973) (hearsay testimony
that would not be admissible at trial is not admissible to support
or oppose summary judgment).

Similarly, the statements of the

Credit Union's representative about her own beliefs as to property
value and her subjective bidding intentions

(Record p. 35) are

simply unsubstantiated conclusions and are insufficient under Rule
56; an affidavit containing only unsubstantiated conclusions and
failing to state evidentiary facts is insufficient to create an
issue of fact.

Id.

The Summary Judgment was based upon the form of the Notice of
Trustee's Sale being in substantial compliance with the statutory
requirements.
Notice

was

(Record pp. 79-80; see Addendum.) The form of the

not

unsubstantiated

related

in

any

way

to

the

Credit

Union's

opinions of the property value or its alleged

bidding intentions, so those allegations failed to raise a genuine
issue of material fact.

Summary judgment is not precluded "simply

whenever some fact remains in dispute, but only when a material
fact is genuinely controverted."

Healar Ranch, Inc. v. Stillman,

619 P.2d 1390, 1391 (Utah 1980).

9

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Credit Union makes the definitional argument that the
statutory term, "the courthouse", has only one possible definition;
and the hyper-technical argument that a sale held elsewhere cannot
possibly be valid.

While the Credit Union argues that the place of

sale was not "the courthouse", the District Court did not determine
whether it was or was not "the courthouse."

The Credit Union's

argument simply ignores the prior decisions of this Court and the
Utah Supreme Court regarding foreclosure procedures and sales.
Even if the Notice or place of sale were in error, the Courts do
not invalidate sales on the basis of such immaterial errors when
the purposes of notice have been met. The purpose of the Notice of
Trustee's Sale is to inform persons who have an interest in the
property of the coming sale, so they may act to protect their
interests.
The

District

Court

correctly

determined

that

the

Bank's

specification and use of the place of sale identified in the Bank's
Notice,

if

erroneous,

was

an

immaterial

error

because

objectives of the statutory notice requirement were met.

the
All

persons with an interest in the property were notified of the sale
and the specific address at which the sale was to be held.

The

Credit Union admits it received actual notice and discussed the
forthcoming sale with both the Bank and Mr. Stevens.

It simply

failed to act to protect itself, either before or at the sale.
Furthermore,

the

notice

requirements

are

intended

debtors, not creditors such as the Credit Union.

to

protect

The District

Court correctly concluded that the interests of the debtor were not

10

sacrificed in the sale, and the debtor has not complained of the
sale.

The District Court correctly concluded that any injury to

the Credit Union resulted from its own error, and the Credit Union
cannot use its own error as a loophole or escape mechanism.
The Credit Union's argument about "inadequacy" of the sale
price is raised too late, is not properly supported on the Record
and is not supported by Utah case law.

The Credit Union can

identify no fraud or unfair dealing associated with the trustee's
sale, and the courts recognize that forced sales rarely produce
prices near actual value. The District Court correctly declined to
invalidate this trustee's sale.
ARGUMENT
POINT I: "THE COURTHOUSE" IS AN
AMBIGUOUS TERM, AND ITS DEFINITION
IS NOT THE TRUE ISSUE ON THIS APPEAL
A.
Union

The Credit Union's definitional argument.

cites

Utah

Code

Ann.

§57-1-25(2),

which

The Credit

provides

that

trustee's sales should be held "at the courthouse of the county in
which the property to be sold or some part thereof is situated."
The Credit Union argues that the term

"the courthouse" is so

patently unambiguous and clear that it was error for the District
Court to sustain the foreclosure sale.
Black's

Law

Dictionary,

the

Credit

On the meager authority of
Union

argues

that

"the

courthouse", which the Utah Legislature left undefined, can have
only one possible meaning.
Taken to its logical conclusion, the Credit Union's argument
would be that the designation of the place of sale in a Notice of
Trustee's Sale need not even include the specific address of the
11

place

of

sale; it would

be

sufficient

to recite merely

courthouse of Washington County" as the place of sale.

"the

The Credit

Union would further conclude that any specific address given in the
Notice may be ignored entirely, as the Credit Union did with the
Bank's

Notice, because

"the

courthouse"

is

such

a

clear

and

complete identification.
The Credit Union's argument ignores the fact that there may be
more

than

one

"courthouse"

in

a

county.

The

Credit

Union

stipulated that the building at which the Bank's foreclosure sale
was noticed and conducted is still commonly called the "courthouse"
or "old courthouse," so that the term "courthouse" is used in
Washington County to refer to both the newer Washington County Hall
of Justice and the former Washington County Courthouse at the
specific address given in the Notice of which the Credit Union
complains.

(Record pp. 20-21, 38.)

Furthermore, the Fifth District Court was well-aware of the
fact that it sits in an Iron County "courthouse" in both Parowan
and Cedar City, and that the District, Juvenile and Circuit Courts
of Salt Lake County occupy several different locations. Faced with
the reality that the term "courthouse" may in fact refer to more
than one building or location, simple good sense prevented the
District Court from concluding that this dispute should have been
resolved by the blind adoption of the Credit Union's definitional
argument.
The true issue on this appeal is not the definition of the
term

"courthouse",

it

is

whether

noticing

and

conducting

a

foreclosure sale at a former courthouse, where the specific address

12

was given in the Notice of Trustee's Sale but was ignored by the
Credit Union, is a material error.

Mr. Stevens submits that the

District Court correctly rejected the Credit Union's definitional
argument in its Summary Judgment.
declined

The District Court correctly

to determine whether the Bank's place of sale was a

"courthouse".
B.

The "strict compliance requirement".

The Credit Union

argues that the term "shall" in the foreclosure statute makes the
statutory provisions mandatory to such an extent that only perfect
compliance with all requirements will allow a foreclosure sale to
be

upheld.

The

Credit

Union's

argument

simply

ignores

the

decisions of this Court and the Utah Supreme Court about the
sufficiency of meeting the objectives of statutory

foreclosure

requirements and the immateriality of certain errors in notice or
procedures.
The objective of the notice requirements is to
protect the rights of those with an interest in the
property to be sold. The sufficiency of the notice
or the validity of a subsequent sale will not be
affected by immaterial errors and mistakes if those
objectives are met.
Occidental/Nebraska Federal Savings Bank v. Mehr, 791 P.2d 217, 220
(Utah App. 1990).
The authorities regarding immaterial errors are discussed at
length below.

The Court should note that, in every decision cited

in Point II below, and every decision cited by the Credit Union on
this issue (Credit Union's Brief, pp. 13-16), a failure to comply
strictly with a mandatory or "shall" requirement was held to be
immaterial and insufficient to justify overturning a foreclosure
sale.
13

POINT II: THE FORECLOSURE SALE WAS
VALID BECAUSE THE PURPOSE AND
OBJECTIVE OP NOTICE WERE MET
The

Credit

Union

has

challenged

the

District

Court's

conclusion that the Bank's foreclosure sale was valid, and contends
that the purpose of notice was not met.
Summary

Judgment

(Record

p.

80;

see

The District Court's
Addendum)

recites

its

conclusion as follows:
Notwithstanding the fact that Olympus Bank's
foreclosure sale was conducted at a location that
does not house a court, the foreclosure sale is
valid because the Notice of Trustee's
Sale
adequately described the location of the sale to
all parties with an interest in the Property.
Consequently, the rights of all parties with an
interest in the Property were protected and the
purpose of the notice requirement was met.
Mr.

Stevens

submits

that

the

District

Court

correctly

interpreted the facts and the prior decisions of this Court and the
Utah Supreme Court.
A*

The purpose of notice is to provide information, and the

Credit Union had actual notice.

The Credit Union has relied in

part upon Concepts, Inc. v. First Security Realty Services, Inc.,
743 P.2d 1158 (Utah 1987), for its proposition that nonjudicial
foreclosure sales can proceed only in compliance with "'strict'
notice requirements," but that case fails to support the Credit
Union's conclusion.

The plaintiff in Concepts, Inc. was a debtor

who sought to have a foreclosure sale overturned on the basis of a
typographical error in the notice of sale.

The year in which the

sale was to be held was incorrectly stated in the notice.
trial court

held that

the sale

was void,

14

The

but the Supreme Court

reversed

that

decision,

holding

that

the

notice

of

sale

substantially complied with the statutory requirements. The Court
explained:
The purpose of strict notice requirements in a
nonjudicial sale of property secured by trust deed is to
inform persons with an interest in the property of the
pending sale of that property, so that they may act to
protect those interests.
743 P. 2d at 1159.

The Court concluded that the debtor was not

misled by the notice and held that the notice was sufficient to
provide the necessary information.
In the case before this Court, as in Concepts, Inc. , the
District Court had to determine whether the Notice of Trustee's
Sale gave persons with an interest in the property sufficient
information, so that they could act to protect themselves.
The stipulated facts establish that the Credit Union was fully
informed of the pending sale.

Notice was given by recording,

mailing, posting and publication.

(Record pp. 19, 38.) There can

be no question whatsoever that the Credit Union had actual notice
of the foreclosure sale well in advance of the sale; the Credit
Union's agents discussed the coming sale with both the Bank and Mr.
Stevens prior to the sale, and the Credit Union retained legal
counsel and attempted to attend the sale.

(Record pp. 18, 21, 3 8.)

The sale was attended by six people, half of whom made bids for the
property (Record pp. 20, 38), but the Credit Union simply failed to
pay enough attention to the Notice of Trustee's Sale and went to
the wrong location.

The results of that failure should not be

imposed upon either the Bank or Mr. Stevens.
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There was no reason whatsoever that the Credit Union could not
have attended the sale and protected its interests.

The sale was

held precisely as specified in the Notice of Trustee's Sale.

Any

problem could have been avoided if the Credit Union had questioned
the place of sale or objected to it at any time prior to or at the
sale.

Instead, the Credit Union ignored the information provided

by the Notice, and failed to act to protect itself.
The principles of Concepts, Inc. did not require the Bank to
insure the Credit Union against its own inaction.

The Bank was

only required to provide sufficient information through notice to
allow the Credit Union to act to protect itself, and the District
Court correctly concluded that the notice was adequate.
B.

The objective of notice is the protection of debtors, not

creditors.

In the Concepts, Inc. case, the trustee's sale was

challenged by the lender, who was the purchaser at the trustee's
sale.

The lender had failed to commence a deficiency action within

three months after the trustee's sale, so it attempted to use an
error in its own notice of sale to set aside the sale and conduct
a new foreclosure.

The Supreme Court explained:

Defendant's argument that the flaw in the notice by
publication invalidated the sale to it perverts and uses
as a sword a statute that was meant to shield the
property rights of a trustor. A sale once made will not
be set aside unless the interests of the debtor were
sacrificed or there was some attendant fraud or unfair
dealing.
743 P. 2d at 1160 (emphasis by the Court).
authorities

in

its explanation

compliance with the statute
debtor'...".

Id.

that

The Court cited several

"[t]he

reason

for

strict

'is to protect the property of the

(citation omitted; emphasis by the Court).
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The

Court concluded that the debtor's interests had been protected by
the foreclosure statutes, and held that the lender could not use
its own typographical error to set aside a foreclosure sale where
only the lender's interests were at stake.

Id. at 1161.

The District Court in the present case similarly concluded
that the sale was valid because "[t]here is no evidence that the
interests of the debtors were sacrificed in the sale."
Judgment, Record p. 80; see Addendum.)

(Summary

It is significant that the

debtor who was foreclosed by the Bank has not complained about the
sale.

The significance of this fact has also been recognized by

this Court:

"[T]he trustor, to whom the protections of the trust

deed statute inure, has not challenged the validity of the initial
sale."

Occidental/Nebraska Federal Savings Bank v. Mehr, 791 P.2d

217, 221 (Utah App. 1990).

Citing Concepts, Inc., this Court has

also explained that "[t]he detailed procedural requirements for a
trustee's sale of real property under Utah Code Ann. §§57-1-23 to 34 (1986) are intended to protect the debtor/trustor."

Jones v.

Johnson, 761 P.2d 37, 41 n.2 (Utah App. 1988).
The District Court in the present case correctly applied this
principle to the fact that there is no evidence on the Record that
the Bank's foreclosure sale sacrificed the interests of the debtor.
In fact, the Credit Union asserted that the debtor had

filed

bankruptcy (Affidavit of Blake, Record p. 12) and, at the Court's
request, the Court was given a certified copy of the debtor's
Discharge in Bankruptcy.
Credit

Union, but

trustee's sale.

not

(Record pp. 73-74.)
the

debtor, would

be

Consequently, the
affected

by

the

The only complaint is by the Credit Union, a

creditor which received actual notice of the sale and attempted to
17

attend the sale, failing to attend only because of its failure to
pay

attention

to the Notice.

The protections

of the

notice

requirement of the trust deed statute are not intended to apply
here.
C.

Immaterial errors do not invalidate foreclosure sales.
This Court discussed the purpose of foreclosure notice

requirements in Occidental/Nebraska Federal Savings Bank v. Mehr,
791 P.2d 217 (Utah App. 1990).

In connection with its explanation

of the principle of debtor protection, this Court explained:
The "detailed procedural requirements for a trustee's
sale of real property are intended to protect the
debtor/trustor."
. . . The objective of the notice
requirements is to protect the rights of those with an
interest in the property to be sold. The sufficiency of
the notice or the validity of a subsequent sale will not
be affected by immaterial errors and mistakes if those
objectives are met.
791 P.2d at 220 (citations omitted; emphasis added).

This Court

further explained what would constitute a material error in the
foreclosure process:
A party may have an apparently valid trustee's sale set
aside for irregularity, want of notice, or fraud if there
is evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption of its
validity . . . .
[T]he only kinds of defects in the
notice of a foreclosure sale that will justify a
renunciation of the sale are "those that would have the
effect of chilling the bidding and causing an inadequacy
of price." . . . A sale once made will not be set aside
unless the interests of the debtor were sacrificed or
there was some fraud or unfair dealing . . . .
Absent
evidence tending to show the above factors, a trustee's
sale will not be set aside.
791 P.2d at 221 (citing Concepts. Inc.).

Accordingly, the Bank's

foreclosure sale is presumed to be valid, and the Credit Union
would have been entitled to have the sale set aside only by showing
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that an irregularity, a want of notice or a fraud had caused the
interests of the debtor to be sacrificed through a "chilling of the
bidding."
There certainly
foreclosure.

was not a want of notice

in the

Bank's

The stipulated facts demonstrate that the Credit

Union received actual notice of the sale, and could have attended
the sale as easily as did Mr. Stevens and the five other persons
who apparently had no trouble understanding the Notice and who did
attend the sale.

(Record pp. 20,38.)

The only "irregularity"

alleged by the Credit Union is the place of sale, but the place of
sale was specifically identified in the Notice and was recognized
by at least the six persons who attended the sale.

Furthermore,

the place of sale was not just a random location, but a site at
which

trustee's

sales

(Record pp. 22, 38.)

were

still

being

routinely

conducted.

Finally, the Credit Union has not alleged

that the Bank's foreclosure was affected by any form of fraud.
Having no evidence of fraud or unfair dealing, the Credit
Union also cannot show that the bidding was "chilled."

The debtor

has' not complained about the sale or the sale price, and Credit
Union cannot demonstrate that the interests of the debtor were
sacrificed, but only that the Credit Union's own interests were
left unprotected by its failure to attend the sale.

Consequently,

the only potential bidder whose bid was arguably chilled was the
Credit Union, since bids were received
attended the sale.

(Record pp. 20,38.)

from three persons who
Bidding is not "chilled"

when an interested party simply ignores the notice of sale.

The

facts do not provide the Credit Union with any basis for overcoming
the presumption that the sale was valid.
19

It is significant that the Credit Union does not contend that
anyone but itself was misled by the Notice so that any other bids
were chilled.
because they
property.

In fact, at least six people were not misled,
attended

the sale, and half of them bid on the

(Record pp. 20, 38.)

"Defendant's statement that the

[defect in the notice] had the potential to mislead prospective
bidders

is

insufficient

to

conclude

that

it

in

fact

did."

Concepts, Inc. v. First Security Realty Services, I n c . , 743 P.2d
1158, 1160 (Utah 1987).
The District Court correctly concluded that the foreclosure
sale was valid because the Notice adequately described the location
of sale and any error therein was immaterial.

Consequently, the

purpose of the notice requirement was met.
POINT III: MERE INADEQUACY OF PRICE,
EVEN IP ESTABLISHED, WILL NOT JUSTIFY
OVERTURNING A TRUSTEE'S SALE
A.

This issue cannot be first raised on appeal. Having been

unable to establish any material error in the Notice of Trustee's
Sale or as to the place of sale, the Credit Union has now argued
that the price paid by Mr. Stevens at the trustee's sale was
"substantially inadequate" and that such inadequacy would justify
overturning the sale.

This argument

is not mentioned

in the

District Court's Summary Judgment, because it was not raised by
anything in the Credit Union's motion or memorandum, except one
statement in the Credit Union's memorandum that "the bidding was
'Chilled' [sic] and caused an inadequate price."

(Record p. 41.)

The issue and argument in the Credit Union's Brief on appeal was
not

adequately raised

at the District Court
20

and cannot be first

raised on appeal. Smith v. Iverson, 848 P. 2d 677 (Utah 1993) ("the
trial court should have the first opportunity to address issues
later raised on appeal"; issues not framed in complaint or in
summary

judgment

motion

or

memorandum

are

not

considered

on

appeal).
B.

This issue is not properly raised by evidentiary facts.

The facts asserted by the Credit Union in support of this argument
are entirely hearsay and unsubstantiated opinions, which are not
sufficient to support or oppose a summary judgment motion.

This

deficiency in the Credit Union's argument has been discussed at pp.
8-9 above.
C.

The Credit Union cannot show fraud or unfair dealing.

Even if this Court allows the Credit Union to raise the issue of
adequacy

of price, the authorities cited by the Credit Union

entirely fail to support its conclusion.

The principle upon which

the Credit Union relies, as it applies in Utah, is succinctly
stated in an early case which is not cited by the Credit Union,
First National Bank of Salt Lake City v. Haymond, 89 Utah 151, 57
P.2d

1401

deficiency
property

(1936).

In that

judgment

in a mortgage foreclosure.

had

case the debtor

a value exceeding

appealed

from a

The mortgaged

$8,000, but had been

sold

at

sheriff's sale for only $100, leaving a deficiency of more than
$2,000.

The Court stated, without citing authorities, the Utah

version of the principle argued by the Credit Union in the present
case:
It is quite generally held that substantial
inadequacy of price, coupled with fraud, mistake,
or other unfair dealing is sufficient to justify a
court of equity upon timely motion to set aside the
sale and order a resale.
21

89 Utah at 159.

While it recognized this principle, the Court

found no fraud, mistake or other unfair dealing as to the sale
which would justify overturning it, and affirmed the deficiency
judgment.
The Credit Union relies heavily upon Pender v. Dowse, 1 Utah
2d 283, 265 P. 2d 644

(1954) in which

a debtor challenged

execution sale which was not related to mortgage financing.

an
A

property valued at $8,000 had been sold to satisfy a judgment for
costs in the amount of $22.80.

The Court noted that no notice of

the sale had been given to the debtor or his attorney, the creditor
had

refused

to

levy

on

available

personal

property,

and

the

creditor and his attorney had acted unfairly and fraudulently in
the conduct of the execution sale.

The Court affirmed the trial

court's judgment setting aside the execution sale, on the same
principle as recited in the Haymond case:
It is well settled that equity will intervene and
set aside an execution sale . . . where it appears
the consideration was grossly inadequate and the
sale was attended by unfairness and fraud.
265 P. 2d at 647.

Having found a "grossly inadequate" sale price

and unfairness and fraud, the sale was correctly set aside.
The Pender and Haymond cases illustrate that the Utah courts
have adopted a form of the principle asserted by the Credit Union,
without adopting the expansive language cited by the Credit Union
from the courts of other states.

Pender and Haymond

illustrate

foreclosure

that

the

fact

that

a

sale

further

price

is

significantly less than the value of the property sold is entirely
insufficient to overturn the sale.
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Actual fraud or unfair dealing

must also be shown before a court will ignore the presumption that
the sale was valid.
Several of the cases cited by the Credit Union fail to support
its argument because the courts ultimately declined to overturn a
sale in spite of significantly low sales prices. McHuqh v. Church.
583 P. 2d 210 (Alaska 1978) (property potentially worth $300,000
sold for $98,000); Bullington v. Mize. 25 Utah 2d 173, 478 P.2d 500
(1970) (property worth $97,500 sold for $25,000); Steward v. Good,
51 Wash. App. 509, 754 P.2d 150 (1988) (property worth $64,000 sold
for $4,870).

In each instance, as in Haymond, there was not

evidence of fraud or unfair dealing, but a mere inadequacy of
price.

The courts acknowledge that "a forced sale of land by

auction rarely brings a price which approximates its actual value,"
McHuqh v. Church, 583 P. 2d at 214, and will not overturn a sale
without evidence of fraud or unfair dealing.
The other cases cited by the Credit Union, in which sales were
set aside, also illustrate the necessity of finding fraud or unfair
dealing.

Schroeder v. Young, 161 U.S. 334 (1896) (fraud in conduct

of successive sales); Graffam v. Burgess, 117 U.S. 180

(1886)

(creditor intentionally misled debtor); Arnold v. Gebhardt, 604
P.2d

1192

(Colo. App. 1979)

(trustee misrepresented

length of

redemption period); McCartney v. Frost, 386 A.2d 784 (Md. 1978)
(statute required sheriff to obtain reasonable price or postpone
sale); Miebach v. Colasurdo, 102 Wash. 2d 170, 685 P.2d 1074 (1984)
(creditor made no effort to satisfy claim from personal property,
as required by statute).
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The Credit Union's authorities establish that a mere disparity
between the price paid at a foreclosure sale and the value of the
property sold will not affect the validity of the sale, without
significant evidence that the disparity resulted
unfair dealing.

from fraud or

The Credit Union, by the use of hearsay and

unsubstantiated opinions, compares Mr. Stevens's successful bid of
$35,010 to a supposed value of $60,000 to $96,000, and concludes
that the bid was inadequate.

The Credit Union cannot point to any

evidence, however, of fraud or unfair dealing as required by the
courts.

The Credit Union's argument is not a substitute for facts,

and even the foreign jurisdictions which apply the principle more
liberally would not accept the Credit Union's argument.
POINT IV: THE CREDIT UNION CANNOT
USE ITS OWN MISTAKE AS AN EXCUSE
TO OVERTURN THE FORECLOSURE SALE
The concept that a party cannot use its own error as the basis
for overturning a foreclosure sale was a factor in this Court's
decision

to

uphold

a

foreclosure

sale

in

Occidental/Nebraska

Federal Savings Bank v. Mehr, 791 P.2d 217 (Utah App. 1990).

In

that case, the foreclosing lender had conducted two foreclosure
sales, and its bid at the second sale was less than one-half the
amount

of

its bid

deficiency.

at the

first

sale, thus

leaving

a

larger

The lender sought to avoid the first sale, and the

smaller deficiency, on the basis that its own notice of sale was
given only two months after the filing of an amended notice of
default.

This Court held that the lender had failed to prove that

the interests of the debtor had been infringed by the notice, and
affirmed the trial court's decision upholding the sale. This Court
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noted

that

"Occidental

failed

to

establish

any

compelling

justification which would allow it to utilize its own error to
invalidate the . . . trustee's sale."

791 P.2d at 221.

This Court applied this same principle again only seven months
later in Thomas v. Johnson, 801 P.2d 186 (Utah App. 1990).

In that

case, the debtor had appealed from a deficiency judgment entered
against him after a trust deed foreclosure.

It was undisputed that

the debtor had received proper notice of sale, but he chose not to
attend the sale or submit a bid.

Consequently, the only bidder at

the sale was the beneficiary under the trust deed.

The debtor did

not challenge the sufficiency of the notice, but contended that the
beneficiaryfs bid of the "fair market value", without making it a
specific dollar amount, was

improper.

This Court upheld

the

deficiency judgment, however:
We can find no evidence that Johnson's [the debtor's]
interests were sacrificed by the trustee's action at the
November 1987 sale . . . .
Furthermore, Johnson could
have attended the trustee's sale and made a fixed-dollar
bid to protect his own interests, but he chose not to .
. . . Any injury to Johnson's interests resulted from
his own inaction and imprudent judgment, not from any
noncompliance with the statutes governing nonjudicial
foreclosure sales. We therefore conclude that the trial
court properly declined to set aside the trustee's sale
in this case.
801 P.2d at 189 (emphasis added).

Even though the objection was

made by the debtor, whose interests the statutory provisions are
intended

to protect, the debtor

could

not rely upon his own

inaction and imprudent judgment to set aside a sale.
Mr. Stevens submits that this principle applies to the facts
before this Court.
self-inflicted.

Any injury to the Credit Union was entirely

The

Credit Union
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cannot

establish

that

any

interested party, except itself, had any trouble attending the
foreclosure sale.

The statutes are not intended to protect the

Credit Union from itself.
Mr. Stevens submits that the Credit Union was not actually
misled by the Notice of Trustee's Sale.
the

Credit

location.

Union's

representatives

The facts show only that

simply

went

to

the

wrong

The Credit Union made no objection to the Notice or the

location of the sale until after it had failed to attend the sale.
If this had resulted from the Credit Union's failure to read the
Notice, that could provide no ground for avoiding the sale.
sales

could

received,

be

the

avoided

simply

foreclosure

by

process

ignoring
would

notices
become

If

actually
completely

unreliable.
The Credit Union alleges that it did read the Notice, however.
If so, it apparently acted on the basis of assumption by going to
the

wrong

location

for

the

sale.

It

would

be

completely

unreasonable, however, for the Credit Union to read the Bank's
Notice and then assume

(a) that "Washington County Courthouse"

really meant "Hall of Justice", and (b) that "197 East Tabernacle"
meant nothing at all.

If the Credit Union was misled, it was

misled by its own false assumptions and not by anything contained
in the Notice of Trustee's Sale.
CONCLUSION
The Credit Union cannot meet the burden of showing adequate
grounds for overturning this foreclosure sale.

The objectives of

the notice requirements were met by the Notice of Trustee's Sale.
The Credit Union either failed to read the Notice, or it read the
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Notice and ignored it.

This cannot justify overturning this sale.

The District Court's Summary Judgment was no error, and it should
be affirmed.
DATED this

day of August, 1993.
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH

Bv: *&\ • ( $ L Q L ^ r i (htfroLy^
.
G. Rand Beacham
Attorneys for Joseph E. Stevens

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the
day of August, 1993, I
caused to be mailed two (2) true and correct copies of the
foregoing Brief of Appellee Joseph E. Stevens to each of the
following:
LaMar J Winward
Attorney at Law
150 North 200 East #204
St. George, Utah 84770
Marlon L. Bates
Scalley & Reading
261 East 300 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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ADDENDUM

NOTICE OF TRUSTEE'S SALE
The following described real property will be sold at
public auction to the highest bidder, purchase price payable in
lawful money of the United States of America at the time of sale,
at the South Steps of the Washihgton County Courthouse, at or about
197

East

Tabernacle, St. George, Washington County, Utah,

on

Tuesday, October 20, 1992, at the hour of 10:00 a.m. of that day
for the purpose of foreclosing a trust deed executed by Herbert L.
Norcross and Linda J. Norcross, as Trustors, in favor of Prudential
Federal Savings and Loan Association as beneficiary. The aforesaid
deed of trust was recorded on September 14, 1976 in book 202, page
118, entry no. 177752 in the official records of Washington County,
state of Utah as assumed by Glenn Hafen and Linda Hafen on August
9, 1978.

The real property covered by the aforementioned deed of

trust and this notice of trustee's sale is located at 930 South
1420 West, St. George, Washington County, state of Utah, and is
more particularly described as follows:
All of Lot Nine (9) , GREET! VALLEY SUEDIVISICM,
a Subdivision according to the Official Plat
thereof, on file in the Office of the Recorder
of Washington County, State of Utah.
The

beneficiary

directted

the substitute

trustee

to

foreclose the aforementioned deed of trust for the purpose of
paying certain obligations secured thereby, including the unpaid
principal balance of that certain promissory note, dated September
8, 1976 all accrued interest to date, any late charges authorized
C: \F 0*ECtOS\HAF EM. UTS
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preparation
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MARLON L. BATES, /4794
SCALLEY & READING
Attorneys for Olympus Bank, a Federal Savings Bank
2 61 East 3 00 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-7870
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SOUTHERN UTAH FEDERAL CREDIT
UNION,

:

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.

:

OLYMPUS BANK, and JOSEPH E.
STEVENS,

Civil No. 920501095

Defendants.

:

Judge J. Philip Eves

This matter came before the Court pursuant to the Motions
for Summary Judgment filed by plaintiff, Southern Utah Federal
Credit Union (hereinafter "SUFCU") and defendant, Olympus Bank
(hereinafter "Olympus Bank").
Olympus

Bank,

and

defendant

In support of these motions, SUFCU,
Joseph

E. Stevens

(hereinafter

"Stevens") filed memoranda of points and authorities which set
forth certain undisputed facts and presented written arguments in
support of said motions.

Furthermore, a hearing was aeld on

December 17, 1992 at the hour of 9:30 a.m. wherein SUFCU, Olympus
Bank, and Stevens were all represented by their respective counsel
of record and oral arguments were heard in support of said motions.
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thereof, on file in the office of the recorder
of Washington County, State of Utah,
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via

office return receipts on October 5, 1992.

Neither of the two

notices which were sent via regular mail were ever returned to
Olympus Bank as undeliverable.
In addition to the mailing of Notices of Trustee's Sale
to all interested parties, Olympus Bank caused the notice to be
posted on the subject property and in three public places in
Washington County, Utah on September 27, 1992.

Furthermore,

Olympus Bank caused the notice to be published in The Daily
Spectrum on Tuesday, September 22, 1992; Tuesday, September 29,
1992; and on Tuesday, October 6, 1992.

The Notice of Trustee's

Sale recited that the sale would be held at the Washington County
Courthouse, at or about 197 East Tabernacle in St. George, Utah.
The building located at 197 East Tabernacle in St. George is the
"Washington County Administration Building."

This building does

not house any of the courts.
In times past, the Washington County Administration
building housed the Fifth Judicial District Court and was called
the "Washington County Courthouse." Although the building located
at 197 East Tabernacle no longer houses any courts, it is still
referred to as the "Courthouse" or the "Old Courthouse" by many
residents of St. George, Utah.

Some foreclosure sales are still

conducted at 197 East Tabernacle and title insurance companies
insure such sales.
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SUFCU filed the subject action for declaratory judgment
pursuant to Rule 57 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Utah
Code Annotated S 78-33-1 et seg. (1953, as amended), asking the
Court to determine whether the subject foreclosure sale was valid
under Utah Code Annotated S 57-1-25(2) (1953, as amended) because
it was conducted at 197 East Tabernacle in St. George, Utah rather
than at the Hall of Justice at 220 North 200 East in St. George,
Utah. SUFCU petitioned the Court for a Temporary Restraining Order
to prevent Olympus Bank from conveying title to the Property to
Stevens while the Court determined whether the sale was valid.
Olympus Bank and Stevens did not oppose SUFCU's petition and the
Court granted a Temporary Restraining Order on November 12, 1992
and continued the Order on November 12, 1992 pending a Summary
Judgment or other dispositional hearing.
From the undisputed facts described above, the Court
concludes that there are no material issues of fact in dispute and
this matter is proper before the Court for adjudication pursuant to
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
concludes

that

although

the

building

The Court further

located

at

197

East

Tabernacle, St. George, Utah is generally known or referred to as
a "courthouse" by the general public, it does not currently house
any courts. Nevertheless, the Utah Court of Appeals has held that
"The objective of the notice requirements is to protect the rights
C: \MLB\PLEAD I NG\SOUTHERM. JUO
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M e h r , 791 P. 2d 217 r 220 (Utah App. 1.990,1,
Notwithstanding the fact that Olympus Bank's foreclosure
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adequately described the. location of the sale to ail parties with
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Because

the T e m p o r a r y R e s t r a i n i n g Order

the
which

p r o h i b i t s the t r a n s f e r of t i t l e from O l y m p u s Bank to M:evens '...hoy Id

be terminate l
IT
Summary

Based on the foregoing,
I ". IIRPERY ORnRHI'I'i I I if Olympus Bank's Motion f o r

Judgment

be

and the same

is hereby

granted,

The

f o r e c l o s u r e sale conducted b y Olympus B a n ! on October 20, 1992 a t
1';» 7 Last 'I'd Liet; n..it 1 , i II M

t.eeiirqe „ lit' iilm i i va I i d runi enforceable

in every r e s p e c t and the Temporary Restraining Order prohibiting*
O l y m p u s B a n k from conveying title to the subject real property to

Stevens which was entered by the Court on November 12, 1992 and
continued on November 19, 1992 is hereby terminated.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Southern Utah Federal Credit
Unions Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby denied and the action
filed by Southern Utah Federal Credit Union is hereby dismissed
with prejudice with respect to all parties.
DATED this

day of

Approved as to form:

Lamar J. wihward
Attorney for Southern Utah
Federal Credit Union

G. Rand Beacham
Attorney for Joseph E. Stevens
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